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Abstract
Whether economic growth improves the human lot is a matter of conditions. We
focus on Japan, a country where reforms in the mid-1990s shifted the country from
a pattern of rampant economic growth and stagnant well-being, to one of modest
growth and increasing well-being. We discuss the policy reforms and analyze the
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changes that explain the increase in well-being. In particular, we assess whether
the factors that explain the increase are consistent with those expected from the
reforms. We apply Blinder-Oaxaca decomposition to World Values Survey data.
Results show that well-being increased due to improved conditions for elderly
people, people with children, and women, in other words, the primary groups
targeted by the reforms. We conclude that adopting a system of social safety nets
contributes to make economic growth compatible with increasing well-being over
time.
Key-words
Life satisfaction, Japan, inclusive growth, Blinder-Oaxaca decomposition, World
Values Survey, social safety nets, welfare state
1 Introduction
The relationship between economic growth and well-being has received consid-
erable attention (Sacks et al., 2012; Easterlin et al., 2010). By extending the pos-
sibilities to satisfy people’s needs, economic growth is regarded as a means to
improve quality of life. However, when scholars contrasted the trends of GDP
per capita with those of other objective measures – such as mental illnesses, anx-
iety and depression, suicide rates, or use of psychotropic drugs – they found that
economic growth does not always translate into better lives (Bartolini, 2018, p.
49). Studies using subjective measures of quality of life reached similar conclu-
sions, notably for the United States (Easterlin, 1974; Bartolini et al., 2013a) and
China (Brockmann et al., 2009; Easterlin et al., 2012; Steele and Lynch, 2013;
Bartolini and Sarracino, 2015). In the case of the United States, real GDP per
capita increased by more than 250 percent from 1946 to 2014, but there was no
indication of an overall positive trend in subjective well-being.1 Bartolini et al.
1For the trend in subjective well-being from 1946 to 1970 see Easterlin (1974); and for the
period 1972 - 2014, many authors have documented the lack of a positive trend in the U.S. For
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(2013a) explain the trend since the 1970s with the trends of several economic and
non-economic factors that worked against each other, and for which the combined
effect was slightly negative.2 Moreover, citing the cases of China and Russia,
Easterlin (2013) showed that while these countries experienced unprecedented
growth following the transition, their level of happiness remained basically flat.
This disconnect seems largely due to the deterioration of the social safety net and
to the privatization of social insurance which accompanied the transition. That
does not mean, however, that promoting subjective well-being is impossible. In a
couple of recent contributions Oishi and Kesebir (2015) and Mikucka et al. (2017)
argued that economic growth correlates with well-being when income inequality
declines and social capital increases.
These studies highlight the need to go beyond the question of whether eco-
nomic growth affects well-being, to instead address the questions of (i) under
which conditions does economic growth improve well-being, and (ii) which poli-
cies can we adopt to implement such conditions. The answers could provide the
groundwork to design policies to make economic growth compatible with increas-
ing well-being over time. From this point of view, there is much to learn from the
“positive” examples of when growth and well-being are compatible.
In this paper we focus on Japan, a country where economic reforms in the
early 1990s shifted the country from a pattern of rampant economic growth and
stagnant well-being, to one of moderate growth and increasing well-being. In
particular, we use Blinder-Oaxaca decomposition to determine which changes ex-
plain the increase in well-being from 1990 to 2010. To measure well-being, we use
individual responses to nationally representative surveys from the World Values
Survey (WVS) concerning individuals’ satisfaction with their lives, i.e. life satis-
faction. This analysis allows us to assess the changes which explain the increase
example, recently: O’Connor (2017) and Easterlin (2017), and also those that support the view
that economic growth positively affects subjective well-being (Stevenson and Wolfers, 2008).
2Bartolini et al. (2013a) show that increases in per capita income (per se) positively affected
subjective well-being , but over the same period, social comparisons increased (mitigating two
thirds of the benefits from greater income), confidence in institutions declined, and social capital
declined. The net result for Americans’ well-being is negative. Similar evidence is available for
Germany (Bartolini et al., 2013b).
3
in well-being over time in Japan and, most importantly, which policies made this
change possible. We thereby make the point that it is possible to design policies
that make economic growth compatible with long term well-being growth.
Japan constitutes an ideal case study. It experienced two phases since 1980:
one of economic growth and stagnating well-being (1980 - 1990), and one of
modest economic growth and growing well-being (1990 - 2010) during which
Japanese people experienced healthier lives, more social relationships, and higher
overall life satisfaction. To illustrate, we contrast the trends of GDP per capita
(GDP) and life satisfaction between 1981 and 2010 in Figure 1.
Figure 1: Trends of life satisfaction and of GDP (constant 2010 US$) in Japan
between 1981 and 2010.
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Note: Life satisfaction data are from the WVS, whereas GDP figures, presented
in real dollars with base year set to 2010, are issued from the World Development
Indicators of the World Bank. The trends in life satisfaction from WVS are
roughly consistent with those issued from other sources.3
Source: WVS data, authors’ own elaboration.
3Additional sources include the World Database of Happiness, the Public Opinion Survey on
4
The transition from the first to the second phase is characterized by significant
policy changes aimed at increasing social welfare spending, and strengthening
social safety nets. To illustrate this point, we plot life satisfaction and a measure of
the scope and generosity of welfare state policies over time in Japan.4 As observed
in Figure 2, the trend in life satisfaction closely matches that of the Generosity
Index. Thus, the Japanese case allows us to address the two questions raised
above: under which conditions is economic growth and well-being compatible,
and which policy reforms made this possible. These points can help to reform
modern economic policies to make prosperity and well-being compatible.
In what follows, section 2 summarizes the relevant literature. Section 2.1 dis-
cusses the reforms that took place in Japan in the 1990s which moved it towards
a Scandinavian welfare state model. In section 3 and 4 we describe the data and
methods used in the paper. In Section 5 we illustrate our findings, and in section
6 we summarize our main results and policy conclusions.
the Life of the People, and The National Survey of Lifestyle Preferences. The latter two are
nationally representative surveys of Japanese residents administered by the Cabinet Office. From
these sources we compared comparable measures with aggregate life satisfaction from the WVS
and found the trendlines to be roughly consistent.
4The Generosity Index is calculated based on replacement rates, eligibility criteria, and du-
ration of benefit payments associated with unemployment insurance, sickness pay, and public
pensions. It is intended to follow and further develop on Esping-Andersen’s decommodification
index (Scruggs et al., 2017).
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Figure 2: Average life satisfaction and Generosity of Welfare State (Japan 1981-
2010).
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2 Review of the literature
Economists traditionally use income to proxy utility, both at individual and ag-
gregate levels (using Gross Domestic Product per capita for the latter). The idea
is that growing income allows individuals to satisfy more needs, and therefore to
increase people’s utility. Hence, promoting GDP growth has been equated to max-
imizing people’s utility. Yet, income is not the only way to measure utility. For
instance, since the 1970s, psychologists argued that people’s self-reports about
their well-being – so-called subjective well-being – are reliable and valid mea-
sures of how people fare (Diener et al., 1985, 2009; Oswald andWu, 2010). These
measures are usually collected via answers to questions such as: “all things con-
sidered, how satisfied are you with your life as a whole these days?” (Van Praag
et al., 2003). Subjective well-being measures encompass all aspects of an individ-
ual’s life that he or she deems to be important, including material and non-material
factors that are often difficult to measure. Thus, measures of subjective well-being
provide scholars with an alternative way to measure people’s utility.
In recent years, subjective well-being has received considerable attention in
economics, mainly because it allowed economists to test the assumption that
economic growth improves well-being. To date, disagreement remains over the
validity of this assumption. Some scholars argue that contemporary societies
should not expect significant improvements in subjective well-being from eco-
nomic growth (Easterlin, 1974, 2017); others show that economic growth and
increasing subjective well-being are associated over time (see e.g. Stevenson and
Wolfers, 2008; Deaton, 2008; Sacks et al., 2012; Veenhoven and Vergunst, 2013);
others still, point out that whether a relationship exists depends on the set of coun-
tries considered (developed and developing countries vs. transition countries) or
the period of time, i.e. economic growth and the trends of well-being are associ-
ated in the short run, but this association vanishes in the long run (Easterlin and
Angelescu, 2009; Becchetti et al., 2011; Easterlin et al., 2010; Clark et al., 2014;
De Neve et al., 2018; Bartolini and Sarracino, 2014); Beja (2014) has found that
even if the trends of subjective well-being and economic growth are statistically
7
related, the magnitude is too small for growth to have a meaningful impact on
well-being. More recently, some scholars have argued that the question is not
whether, but when and under what conditions is economic growth associated with
increasing subjective well-being (Oishi and Kesebir, 2015; Mikucka et al., 2017).
Indeed, the subjective well-being literature provides evidence for three conditions
that can make economic growth compatible with subjective well-being over time:
income inequality (Oishi and Kesebir, 2015; Mikucka et al., 2017), social capital
(Uhlaner, 1989; Helliwell, 2003, 2008; Bartolini et al., 2013a; Clark et al., 2014),
and social policy (Easterlin, 2013; Ono and Lee, 2016).
Concerning income inequality, the evidence about the cross-sectional relation-
ship with well-being is mixed (e.g. Alesina et al., 2004; Clark and D’Ambrosio,
2015). A possible explanation for contradictory evidence is that the relationship
between inequality and well-being depends on a country’s level of development
(Jiang et al., 2012; Iniguez-Montiel, 2014). However, increasing income inequal-
ity is consistently negatively related to well-being (Bartolini and Sarracino, 2015;
Oishi and Kesebir, 2015; Mikucka et al., 2017). By increasing the opportunities
to establish social comparisons, growing income inequality undermines the pos-
itive effect of income growth for well-being. Raising income inequality can also
undermine well-being by reducing feelings of fairness and trust in others (Oishi
et al., 2011) or by weakening social linkages and feelings of cooperation (Graham
and Felton, 2006; Oishi et al., 2011).
Social capital is defined by OECD (2001) as “networks together with shared
norms, values and understandings that facilitate co-operation within or among
groups”. A large body of research confirms that social capital correlates pos-
itively with subjective well-being at both the individual level (Helliwell et al.,
2017; Clark et al., 2014; Becchetti et al., 2009) and aggregate level over time,
within individual countries (Bartolini et al., 2013a; Bartolini and Sarracino, 2015;
Brockmann et al., 2009; Easterlin et al., 2012) and country panels (Bartolini and
Sarracino, 2014). For a discussion of how social capital and subjective well-being
are related, see Helliwell and Aknin (2018).
The importance of social safety nets for well-being is illustrated by the expe-
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rience of countries that transitioned from communist economic systems (Ono and
Lee, 2013). The post-communist countries of Eastern Europe consistently rank
among the unhappiest in Europe, and life satisfaction on average declined after
the transition. To a large extent, this decline can be attributed to the loss of jobs
and deterioration of the safety net. Under communism, people were guaranteed
jobs, basic income, health insurance, education, and other benefits. While life sat-
isfaction eventually recovered, it took more than ten years and required an increase
in GDP per capita averaging about 25 percent above the 1990s value (Easterlin,
2009, p. 142).5 The transition to market capitalism may have paved the path to
meritocracy, but it was also accompanied by widespread corruption and a collapse
of the social insurance system, which invariably resulted in greater inequality and
lower well-being.
In China, life satisfaction exhibited a similar pattern of collapse and recovery
following the transition, all the while growing at an average annual rate of more
than 9.0%. Potential explanations for these startling facts are discussed in Brock-
mann et al. (2009), Easterlin et al. (2012), Easterlin et al. (2017) and Bartolini and
Sarracino (2015). Each article partially attributes the decline in life satisfaction
to increased social comparisons, especially facilitated by rising income inequality.
Bartolini and Sarracino (2015) document the importance of social capital, estimat-
ing that nearly 19.0% of the well-being loss in China is related to a decrease in
social capital. Easterlin et al. (2012) and Easterlin et al. (2017) instead emphasize
the rise in unemployment, 6 which was inversely related to life satisfaction over
the full cycle from 1990 to 2010 (while inequality, in contrast, rose throughout
the period). And like in the European transition countries, with unemployment
came not only income losses, but also the elimination of social benefits. The loss
of these benefits is expected to have significantly exacerbated the effects of unem-
5It is possible that asymmetric responses to economic collapse and positive income growth
could explain why life satisfaction did not fully recover at the same time as GDP (e.g., from loss
aversion De Neve et al. (2018)), but that is insufficient to explain the pattern in China as discussed
in the next paragraph.
6Due to government restructuring of state-owned enterprises and large rural to urban migration
due to relaxed internal migration laws.
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ployment. Social safety nets are positively related to life satisfaction in general
(Di Tella et al., 2003; Rothstein, 2010; Pacek and Radcliff, 2008; Boarini et al.,
2013; Easterlin, 2013; Ono and Lee, 2016; O’Connor et al., 2017), not just in tran-
sition economies, and the association is not limited to those directly affected (e.g.,
unemployed) (Carr and Chung, 2014).
Summarizing, the decline in Chinese well-being can be explained by (1) in-
creasing income inequality which facilitated increasing social comparisons, (2)
declining social capital, and (3) increasing unemployment accompanied by a severely
reduced social safety net. The recent recovery appears to be driven by improve-
ments in trust, employment, and the social safety net (Easterlin et al., 2017). It is
plausible that the same mechanisms are at work in other countries too, including
Japan.
There are few studies that explain the trend of well-being, measured subjec-
tively, in Japan. In an early study, Easterlin (1995) documents a flat trend in satis-
faction over the period 1958-1987, which occurred despite a concurrent five-fold
increase in real per capita income. More recently, Yamamura (2011) evaluates
life satisfaction in 1979 and 1996 in Japan. Over this period, life satisfaction in-
creased; however, the causes could not be determined based on the cross-sectional
regressions used in the paper. The author also shows that total government ex-
penditures increased over the period, which would suggest a positive link to life
satisfaction, but the increase was not statistically significant.
Following the review of the evidence from other countries, we expect that
changes in income inequality, social capital, and the social safety net could explain
the rise in life satisfaction in Japan between 1990 and 2010. In the next section
we document the Japanese policy reforms of the mid-90s, and then discuss our
expectations for well-being.
2.1 Social insurance system in Japan
In Three Worlds of Welfare Capitalism, Esping-Andersen (1990) provides a com-
mon framework to distinguish various types of welfare states. The essence of the
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typology rests on the key question: who is the main provider of the safety net?
Under the social democratic model (also known as the Scandinavian model) the
role of the state is most prominent, with less reliance on the family and the market.
Under the conservative model, social insurance coverage is relatively narrow, and
the burden falls on families. Under the liberal model, social insurance becomes
more of an individual matter, with greater reliance on privatized markets.
Which regime Japan belonged to was a subject of debate and remained con-
tested for some time until Esping-Andersen (1997) addressed the question in a
follow-up study. In essence, he argued that, prior to the 1990s, Japan’s situa-
tion was rather unique in that the country was a hybrid of both the conservative
and the liberal regimes, situated somewhere “between Europe and America.” The
system resembles an “ad hoc postwar construct” (Esping-Andersen, 1997) of wel-
fare programs from Germany and the U.S., which was built on top of the existing
traditional family-based system of intergenerational dependence. For example,
familialism, i.e. features of the conservative regime such as “filial piety, reverence
of the elderly, and obligations toward family members” (Esping-Andersen, 1997,
p.185) remains powerful and influential.
Under the familialist system which remained prominent during the postwar
period, parents and children were mutually dependent. The majority of young
married couples lived with their parents. The younger couple took care of the
grandparents, who often reciprocated by assisting with childcare and household
chores. The arrangement was especially helpful in the case of dual-career couples
as they were able to depend on their parents to take care of family matters during
their absence from home.
At the same time, aspects of the liberal regime were present, in the form of cor-
poratist or company-sponsored welfare. Indeed, Japanese corporations exempli-
fied “welfare corporatism” (Dore, 1973) or “Japanese style corporatism” (Esping-
Andersen, 1997) with companies providing job security (in the form of lifetime
employment) and extensive benefits for employees and their families. Inequal-
ity in the quality and generosity of benefits exists by virtue of firm-size, with the
greatest benefits being offered to employees in large firms (typically over 1000
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employees). As Aspalter (2006) explains, “Japan continues to display a great du-
ality between welfare provision to workers in large companies and dependents, on
the one hand, and workers in medium-sized and small enterprises, as well as peo-
ple who do not join the workforce, on the other” (p. 292). This corporatist model
of welfare implicitly assumes a traditional division of labor between men and
women: “it implies that families will be quite dependent on the male breadwin-
ner since coverage under social insurance assumes long, unbroken employment
careers” (Esping-Andersen, 1997).
2.1.1 Demographic crisis
The 1990s witnessed a gradual transformation of family and social ties in Japan.
Greater urbanization and industrialization put pressure on extended families. In-
tergenerational ties weakened. The share of three-generation-family households
dwindled from 54 percent in 1975 to 13 percent in 2013 (Ministry of Health,
Labour and Welfare, 2014). The share of the elderly (over age 65) living alone
doubled from 9 percent to 18 percent, and the share of elderly couples living alone
(without children) also doubled from 20 to 39 percent.
The corporate safety net also diminished throughout the 1990s as the Japanese
economy entered a period of prolonged stagnation. Benefits became less generous
as the companies pinched their expenditures. Women entered the labor force in
large numbers, and the traditional male breadwinner model eroded (affecting the
viability of the corporatist model). Moreover, the “good jobs” which offer job
security with good benefits became fewer in number. Lifetime employment was
still offered but the likelihood of getting those offers was declining (Ono, 2010).
The share of workers in nonstandard employment more than doubled from 15
to 38 percent between 1984 and 2016 (Ministry of Health, Labour and Welfare,
2014). Consequently, the population in need of social protection greatly expanded
during the 1990s.
Meanwhile, the population was projected to decline: the fertility rate had been
declining and the population continued to age. In 1989, the country experienced
the “1.57 shock” which was the lowest total fertility rate ever recorded in Japan at
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the time.7
These challenges, especially the fertility shock, sent the country into crisis
mode. Achieving higher fertility and reviving the population could no longer be
left to the market or to families alone: the familialist/corporatist model of social
insurance had reached its breaking point.
2.1.2 Policy responses
To address these issues the government made a clear and conscious decision to
steer course towards the social-democratic welfare regime, eyeing Scandinavian
countries as role models. The (liberal) market-centric regime was unsuitable for
the Japanese ideology as policymakers feared rising inequality. The economic
stagnation of the 1990s also showed that the familialist/corporatist model was
vulnerable and unsustainable as it exposed individuals and households to exces-
sive risk. What was needed was a state-centric model of socializing risk, whereby
social risk is shared equitably by society as a whole (Horioka and Kanda, 2010).
As a consequence, Japan developed a state-sponsored social support system.
Public social expenditures (as percentage of GDP) remained stable at about
10 percent during the 1980s, but increased to 16 percent in 2000 and 23 percent
in 20138. This percentage now exceeds the OECD average of 21 percent, and is
quickly approaching the Scandinavian countries’, for example Sweden, which was
27 percent in 2013. Much of this growth was attributed to a greater allocation of
expenditures targeted at the elderly to care for the aging population. For example,
between 1990 and 2000, expenditures for elderly care alone increased from 0.57
trillion to 3.57 trillion yen, while expenditures for the support of families and
small children increased from 1.6 trillion to 2.74 trillion yen (Peng, 2004). In
recent years, roughly 70 percent of social insurance was allocated towards elderly
care (Oshio et al., 2014), which is a significantly larger share than in other OECD
7The fertility rate declined to its lowest level of 1.26 in 2005, but has since recovered somewhat
to 1.44 in 2016.
8Figures are from the online OECD Social Expenditure Database. For more details, please,
see: http://www.oecd.org/social/expenditure.htm.
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countries (Horioka and Kanda, 2010).
The 2000s witnessed a flurry of reforms targeted at the elderly in the areas of
pension, long-term care insurance, and elderly health care (Oshio et al., 2014).
Previous to 2000, caring for the elderly was covered by either the welfare system
or by the medical system, but these systems faced two constraints: the need to pro-
vide long-term care, and the lengthening of the care period (Ministry of Health,
Labour and Welfare, 2016). Against this backdrop, the Ministry rolled out the
Long-Term Care Insurance System in 2000. It first explained to the public that
traditional family support for the elderly had become unstable and untenable, and
because of the weakening dependence between the elderly and family members,
the country needed a long-term care system “to support the independence of el-
derly people” (Ministry of Health, Labour and Welfare, 2016). To this end, the
Long-Term Care Insurance System developed a broad range of integrated medi-
cal and welfare services and the elderly gained access to a wider range of service
providers to choose from. In 2005, the system was revised to emphasize preven-
tive measures more in hopes of easing the burden of increasing expenditures for
long-term care, e.g. dementia (Oshio et al., 2014).
A number of work-family policies aimed at addressing low fertility were in-
troduced in the 1990s to motivate couples to have at least two children (Brinton
and Mun, 2015). The Angel Plan of 1994 aimed to increase social care and sup-
port for families with small children, for example, by providing childcare services
(An, 2013; Peng, 2004). Toivonen (2007) points out that the Angel Plan was a
key moment when the national government acknowledged that caring for children
was no longer the sole responsibility of the families, but one that requires insti-
tutional support. Following the Angel Plan, the government introduced a num-
ber of measures which provided further support for families and small children.
This included the New Angel Plan (1999), Declining Birthrate Plus One Initiative
(2002), Next Generation Education and Support Promotion Act (2003), and De-
clining Birthrate Society Countermeasures Basic Law (2003) (Oshio et al., 2014).
Through these measures, the national government added more childcare facilities,
introduced parental leave policies, and enhanced income replacement levels. As
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an example of increasing benefits, in 1990 the monthly allowance for families with
small children was nil for the first child, 2500 yen for the second child and 5000
yen for the third child and thereafter. In 2013, this allowance had been raised to
10000 yen for first and second child, and 15000 yen for third child and thereafter
(Chuo-hoki, 2013). In short, the period from 1990 to 2010 was a critical turning
point in the development of the welfare state in contemporary Japan, when the
locus shifted from the family to the state.9
Concerning women, growing opportunities outside the family can be a cause
of tension when they are at the same time expected to fulfill obligations within
the family (Raymo et al., 2015). However, when growing opportunities are ac-
companied by institutional support, e.g. child and elderly care, such tensions
can be alleviated (Ono and Lee, 2016). For example, middle-aged women who
cared for a family member experienced significantly lower subjective well-being
(Moriyama et al., 2018); however, provision of family homecare services signif-
icantly reduced feelings of burden among family caregivers (Kumamoto et al.,
2017). It stands to reason that the benefits of advancing the welfare of the elderly,
families and small children should improve the well-being of women relative to
men.
2.2 Our contribution
The relationship between economic growth and subjective well-being changed at
the same time as important changes in Japanese society. It is possible that the
policy changes caused the Japanese society to shift towards a path of moderate
economic growth and growing well-being, with the latter attributable to the effect
of the policy reforms on the overall population, especially on elderly people and
women. Our aim is to explain Japan’s increase in life satisfaction usingmicro data,
9In spite of these drastic measures by the Japanese government to intervene in the sphere of
elderly care and support for families with small children, the supply of care facilities remains
inadequate. The weakening of family support came suddenly. The speed of transformation was so
swift that the government could not keep up with the demand for facilities. To this day, the demand
for elderly care and childcare facilities far outnumbers the available supply. Japan continues to
invest in the facilities, but the waiting list remains long.
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and to assess whether the factors that explain the increase are consistent with those
expected from the reforms. We focus on the overall impact of the reforms over
this period. Alternative strategies focusing on one reform (such as diff-in-diff) are
not feasible because numerous reforms occurred at approximately the same time,
and their effects can not be disentangled.
3 Data
Our source of data is the World Values Survey, a compilation of internationally
comparable surveys collecting information on many aspects of people’s lives in-
cluding economic, social, cultural and political issues. Each survey provides na-
tionally representative samples of the population of more than 150 countries from
all over the world. In particular, the WVS provides repeated, cross-sectional data
on social capital, subjective well-being, and socio-demographic and economic
variables about Japan intermittently from 1981 to 2010. The Japanese sample is
comprised of about 1000 observations per wave selected according to multi-stage
stratified sampling (WVS, 2014).
Although data for Japan are available beginning in 1981, we solely use the
1981 data for descriptive purposes. Our analysis focuses on the period 1990 - 2010
because our interest is explaining the increase in life satisfaction that occurred
during that period. In contrast, life satisfaction did not change much between
1981 and 1990.
Our measure of well-being is life satisfaction as observed through answers
to the question: “all things considered, how satisfied are you with your life as a
whole these days?”. Answers range from 1 = “dissatisfied” to 10 = “satisfied”.
The WVS also provides another measure of well-being: happiness. However, we
focus only on the former variable for two main reasons: i. life satisfaction (1-10
points scale) provides a better and more differentiated information than happiness
(1-4 points scale); ii. despite the fact that the evidence from the two variables
is often consistent, happiness is usually regarded as a more emotional measure
of well-being, whereas life satisfaction is considered more a cognitive evaluation
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of well-being. Hence, the second is usually regarded as a more reliable measure
(Diener, 2006).
Household income, financial dissatisfaction and social capital are the three
main independent variables. Income is measured through respondents’ evalua-
tions of their own net household income. In particular, respondents are asked
to place themselves on a scale from 1 to 10 where each point corresponds to a
specific income bracket. For present analysis, we substituted each value on the
scale with the average value of the bracket. Subsequently, the income has been
transformed in real Yen of 2005 and converted in logarithm.
Financial dissatisfaction is based on answers to the question: “how satisfied
are you with the financial situation of your household?”. The answers range on a
10 point scale which we inverted so that higher values stand for greater dissatisfac-
tion. Previous studies documented that financial dissatisfaction strongly correlates
with measures of social deprivation, whereas it is weakly predicted by income.
These findings suggest that financial dissatisfaction reflects social comparisons,
i.e. people’s own evaluation of their achievements relative to the achievements of
others (Brockmann et al., 2009; D’Ambrosio and Frick, 2012). Moreover, con-
trolling for income, allows us to account for its possible confounding effect on
financial dissatisfaction, which thus mirrors relative concerns.
We observe social capital using generalized trust, a measure of civic cooper-
ation (civicness), and participation in groups and associations. Trust in others is
measured with the answers to the question: “Generally speaking, would you say
that most people can be trusted, or that you can’t be too careful in dealing with
people?”. Answers are coded 1 if the respondent answers positively, 0 otherwise
(Knack and Keefer, 1997). The index of civicness is based on answers to ques-
tions about whether “avoiding a fare on public transport”, “cheating on taxes if
you have the chance”, “claiming government benefits which you are not entitled
to”, or “accepting a bribe” are acceptable. The answers range on a 1 (never justifi-
able) to 10 (always justifiable) scale. Each variable has been recoded so that larger
values stand for stronger norms of civic cooperation. A factor analysis on the four
questions indicated the stability and comparable magnitude of the factor loadings,
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both across waves and within waves. Thus we created the index of civicness as
the average value of the four initial variables, on a 10 point scale where higher
values stand for higher civicness.
We observe respondents’ involvement in social activities through answers about
their participation in a number of groups and associations. The WVS includes a
large battery of questions asking whether people belong or actively participate
in groups or associations. The list includes – among others – religious, cultural,
sports, professional, environmental, human rights and political associations (for
the complete list of groups or associations see Appendix D). Given the various
nature of participation in groups and associations, we created two dummy vari-
ables which take respectively the value of one if the respondent declared to belong
to a Putnamian or to an Olsonian group, zero otherwise. The distinction between
the two groups of associations is based on the authors’ different views about the
role of the association. Putnam et al. (1993) identify in associations a source of
general trust and of social ties leading to governmental and economic efficiency,
whereas Olson (1982) emphasizes the tendency of associations to act as lobbies
to get policies that protect the interests of special groups at the expenses of the
society as a whole.
We also included a standard set of socio-demographic controls such as gender,
age, marital and employment status, reported health, and the region where the
interview was conducted. Table 1 summarizes the main variables used in this
study together with some descriptive statistics.
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Table 1: Descriptive statistics for Japan between 1990-2010
variable mean sd min max obs missing (%)
satisfaction with life 6.835 1.908 1 10 3038 0
log of yearly income (real Yen 2010) 10.72 0.630 9.110 11.70 2551 16
financial dissatisfaction 4.938 2.208 1 10 2903 4
health 3.536 0.829 1 5 3002 1
social trust 0.402 0.490 0 1 3038 0
civicness 9.279 1.280 0.500 10 3038 0
putnamian groups 0.335 0.472 0 1 3032 0
olsonian groups 0.171 0.376 0 1 3019 1
18 <= age < 35 years 0.229 0.420 0 1 3030 0
35 <= age < 60 years 0.475 0.499 0 1 3030 0
60 years and more 0.296 0.457 0 1 3030 0
female 0.491 0.500 0 1 3038 0
married 0.725 0.447 0 1 3021 1
divorced/separated 0.0453 0.208 0 1 3021 1
widowed 0.0391 0.194 0 1 3021 1
single 0.191 0.393 0 1 3021 1
no child 0.246 0.431 0 1 3008 1
one child 0.134 0.340 0 1 3008 1
two or more children 0.620 0.485 0 1 3008 1
full time 0.421 0.494 0 1 3038 0
part time 0.120 0.325 0 1 3038 0
self employed 0.0932 0.291 0 1 3038 0
retired 0.108 0.310 0 1 3038 0
housewife 0.161 0.368 0 1 3038 0
student 0.0267 0.161 0 1 3038 0
unemployed 0.0158 0.125 0 1 3038 0
other 0.0197 0.139 0 1 3038 0
year – – 1990 2010 3038 0
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4 Method
Our aim is to explain the variation of subjective well-being in Japan and to quan-
tify the relative importance of the changes in social capital, income and social
comparisons along with the other determinants of life satisfaction. To this end we
use the Blinder-Oaxaca decomposition. This technique allows us to decompose
the well-being gap between the initial (1990) and the final year (2010) of obser-
vations and to identify how well the changes in variable values and their relation-
ships with life satisfaction explain the gap. Indeed, life satisfaction may change
because people have more of what matters for well-being (e.g. health), and/or be-
cause the correlation of what matters for well-being changed (e.g. the coefficient
of health in 2010 is higher than in 1990). We consider the latter effect a conse-
quence of a change in people’s preferences. The Blinder-Oaxaca decomposition
allows us to account for the effect of changes in endowments and in preferences
at the same time.
The Blinder-Oaxaca decomposition was developed in the early 1970s by Oax-
aca (1973) and Blinder (1973) to study discrimination between men and women
in the labour market. Recently, it has also been applied in other fields, includ-
ing the literature on subjective well-being (Helliwell and Barrington-Leigh, 2010;
Becchetti et al., 2014; Bartolini and Sarracino, 2015).
The decomposition method is used to study group differences for a given out-
come variable by dividing such differential in two parts: the explained one, ac-
counting for differences in observed characteristics of the population and the un-
explained one, measuring the differences in the coefficients between two groups
or periods (Jann, 2008). The latter is generally considered a discrimination mea-
sure (Jann, 2008). For the purpose of the present article, the decomposition is
used to identify how much of the overall differential in the average life satisfac-
tion between two years can be ascribed to differences in the set of characteristics
as presented in equation 1 (the explained part) and to differences in how these
characteristics correlate with well-being (the unexplained part).
We are aware that the ordered nature of the dependent variable would require
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ordered probit or logit techniques. However, we adopted a linear model for ease of
computation and comparison of the coefficients across years.10 Moreover, the lit-
erature on subjective well-being demonstrated that, when the dependent variable
has a sufficient number of categories, linear models provide equivalent results of
their ordered counterparts. In particular, Ferrer-i Carbonell and Frijters (2004)
conclude that assumptions on ordinality or cardinality of the answers to a subjec-
tive well-being question are “relatively unimportant to results”11.
A downside of the Blinder-Oaxaca approach is that the unexplained part cap-
tures also the potential effects of differences in any unobserved variables (Jann,
2008).
Formally, the decomposition can be represented as follows:
∆LS= [E(X2010)−E(X1990)]
′ ·β ∗
︸ ︷︷ ︸
explained
+[E(X2010)
′ · (β2010−β
∗)+E(X1990)
′ · (β ∗−β1990)]
︸ ︷︷ ︸
unexplained
(1)
where ∆LS is the difference in average subjective well-being between 1990 and
2010, respectively the initial and final year of observations, E(X) is the yearly
average of a vector of explanatory variables – as presented in section 3 – mea-
sured at the beginning and at the end of the period of observation, β2010 and β1990
are vectors of coefficients and β ∗ is a vector of non-discriminatory coefficients
to quantify how much each group of variables explains the overall difference of
means. In all our estimates we use standard errors robust to heteroskedasticity,
and sample weights provided by the World Values Survey.
5 Results
Table 2 reports the coefficients from three ordinary least squares (OLS) regres-
sions of life satisfaction. The coefficients are used in the decomposition as re-
10Estimated coefficients are qualitatively similar to those from ordered probit estimates, which
are available upon request to the authors.
11(pag. 655 Ferrer-i Carbonell and Frijters, 2004)
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ported in equation 1. The first two columns provide the results for the years 1990
and 2010 separately, whereas the third column provides the results from a re-
gression on pooled data. The coefficients in the third column coincide with the
reference β s of the Blinder-Oaxaca decomposition (see β ∗ in equation 1). Re-
sults are consistent with expectations from standard happiness regressions (Dolan
et al., 2008). Specifically, age exhibits a U-shape relation with life satisfaction;
men, and unemployed people are less satisfied than their counterparts; being mar-
ried and high income positively correlate with life satisfaction, and financial dis-
satisfaction negatively. Greater trust and participation in a Putnamian group are
each positively associated with life satisfaction, while membership in an Olsonian
group is not significantly related. Last, as is expected, healthier people are more
satisfied with their lives.
Table 2: Happiness regression in Japan in 1990 and 2010 using an OLS model.
1990 2010 pooled
log yearly income (real Yen 2010) 0.123 (1.21) 0.169∗∗ (2.55) 0.168∗∗ (3.02)
financial dissatisfaction −0.444∗∗∗ (−14.57) −0.389∗∗∗ (−19.56) −0.400∗∗∗ (−23.59)
state of health 0.383∗∗∗ (5.33) 0.526∗∗∗ (10.44) 0.510∗∗∗ (12.37)
trust in others 0.293∗∗ (2.79) 0.193∗∗ (2.59) 0.215∗∗∗ (3.52)
index of civicness 0.0539 (1.55) −0.00363 (−0.12) 0.0166 (0.68)
membership in at least 1 Putnam’s group 0.187 (1.52) 0.110 (1.43) 0.170∗∗ (2.61)
membership in at least 1 Olson’s group −0.256∗ (−1.72) −0.0535 (−0.56) −0.0697 (−0.85)
35 <= age < 60 years −0.538∗∗∗ (−3.85) −0.228∗ (−1.90) −0.259∗∗ (−2.86)
60 years and more −0.568∗∗ (−2.76) 0.0346 (0.23) 0.0315 (0.27)
female 0.000 (0.00) 0.164∗ (1.78) 0.131∗ (1.78)
single −1.233∗∗∗ (−4.50) −0.702∗∗∗ (−4.31) −0.803∗∗∗ (−5.72)
divorced/separated −0.358 (−0.58) −0.641∗∗∗ (−3.65) −0.510∗∗ (−3.09)
widowed −0.438 (−1.18) −0.531∗∗ (−2.76) −0.496∗∗ (−2.91)
one child −0.341 (−1.21) 0.0249 (0.16) −0.0513 (−0.38)
two or more children −0.274 (−1.12) −0.000127 (−0.00) −0.0967 (−0.82)
part time 0.276 (1.60) −0.0997 (−0.79) 0.0173 (0.17)
self employed 0.0504 (0.29) 0.101 (0.63) 0.0602 (0.50)
retired 0.419 (1.39) 0.0146 (0.10) 0.0861 (0.68)
housewife 0.0993 (0.60) 0.0851 (0.65) 0.0620 (0.60)
student −0.246 (−0.69) 0.880∗∗ (2.65) 0.154 (0.56)
unemployed 0.297 (0.33) −0.797∗∗∗ (−3.71) −0.648∗∗ (−3.08)
other −0.317 (−1.15) 0.652 (1.46) 0.248 (0.78)
Constant 6.262∗∗∗ (5.19) 5.314∗∗∗ (6.81) 5.211∗∗∗ (7.94)
Observations 740 1653 2393
Adjusted R2 0.395 0.404 0.397
Standard errors in parentheses
∗ p< 0.05, ∗∗ p< 0.01, ∗∗∗ p< 0.001
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5.1 Decomposition of the well-being gap between 1990 and 2010
As illustrated in Figure 1, life satisfaction increased between 1990 and 2010. In
particular life satisfaction increased from 6.6 to 7.0 on a 10-point scale (see Col-
umn 1, Table 3 in Appendix A). The results of the decomposition show that the
unexplained portion, which can be thought of as a change in preferences or cir-
cumstances, accounts for the bulk of this change, 0.35 points (see the row “total”
in Table 3). The explained portion, which includes changes in characteristics such
as the aging population, only accounts for 0.05 points. However, the aggregate
figures mask considerable heterogeneity.
Figure 3: Explained part of the life satisfaction gap between 1990 and 2010
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Figures 3 and 4 – based on Table 3 – illustrate the detailed results of the de-
composition, i.e. how much change in life satisfaction is explained by each of its
correlates. Although accounting for the smaller portion, it is perhaps more intu-
itive to start with Figure 3, which presents the explained part of the decomposition
of life satisfaction, i.e. the part that is associated with the changes over time in the
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Figure 4: Unexplained part of the life satisfaction gap between 1990 and 2010
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levels of the explanatory variables. The aging of the population predicts a statisti-
cally significant increase in life satisfaction. Improving health and greater mem-
bership in Putnamian groups also predict an increase in life satisfaction. On the
other hand, household income, marriage rates, and social trust declined, which are
associated with reduced life satisfaction. Financial dissatisfaction also increased,
further reducing life satisfaction. The life satisfaction changes associated with
each variable are detailed in Table 4 in Appendix A. The column X2010 provides
the average score of each variable in 2010, while the column X1990 provides the
same information for 1990. For example, the sample proportion of people aged
60 or more increased from 13.8 percent to 35.6 percent.
Figure 4 presents the changes in life satisfaction due to changes in the coeffi-
cients between life satisfaction and each of the predictors included in equation 1.
The impact of increasing age on life satisfaction grew during this period, which
had a positive impact on life satisfaction. The increased relationship supports the
effectiveness of greater government support for elderly people during this period
24
(discussed further below). Similarly, greater government support for women and
families improved women’s relationship with life satisfaction relative to men. The
number of kids is also more positively associated with life satisfaction. Over this
period, changing relationships related to health, household income, marital sta-
tus, and social comparisons also increased life satisfaction. Health and income
became more important while marital status (single relative to married) and social
comparisons became less important. Changing relationships related to civicness,
participation in Putnamian groups, and social trust correlate less with life satis-
faction over time, i.e. their coefficients became smaller between 1990 and 2010.
The column β2010 of Table 4 lists the coefficients from a happiness regression esti-
mated on the subsample of year 2010, while β1990 provides the same information
relative to year 1990. Using age again as an example, in 1990 being 60 or older
was negatively associated with life satisfaction (-0.568 life satisfaction points rel-
ative to being less than 35), but in 2010 this relationship turned positive, although
not significant, meaning that people 60 or older in 2010 are no longer less satisfied
with their lives than younger people.
The sizes of the explained and unexplained changes in life satisfaction, by
variable, are presented in Table 3. Aging, health, gender, and social trust had
consistent relations with life satisfaction. The aging population (explained por-
tion) which also became relatively more satisfied with being older (unexplained)
were each positively correlated with life satisfaction. People became healthier and
health mattered more in 2010 than it did in 1990. There were more women (as
a proportion)12 and they became relatively more satisfied. Social trust worked in
the opposite direction; trust declined and it also had a smaller positive relation-
ship with life satisfaction in 2010. If trust had not changed since 1990, than life
satisfaction in 2010 would have been 0.12 points higher than observed, i.e. 0.52
rather than 0.40. The other variables had contradictory changes (e.g., household
income and social comparisons).
The improvement in health likely reflects the global trend in improving health
12It makes sense that there would be more women because the population aged and women live
longer on average.
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care (though perhaps not access), and growing importance makes sense for an
older population. Social trust and its importance likely declined as a result of
Japan modernizing. The improving relationships of life satisfaction with age and
women are consistent with the policy changes discussed in section 2.1. For this
reason we further focus on people aged 60 and over, and women.
5.2 Decomposition of the well-being gap between 1990 and 2010
for elderly people
Column 1 in Table 5 in Appendix B reports the results of the decomposition of the
life satisfaction gap for people aged 60 years or more. Between 1990 and 2010 the
average life satisfaction of elderly people in Japan increased from 6.7 in 1990 to
7.2 in 2010. The decomposition indicates that the largest share of this difference is
attributable to changes in people’s preferences over time. These changes account
for nearly three quarters of the overall difference.
Figure 5 – based on Table 5 – shows the main predictors of the unexplained
part of the life satisfaction gap. Between 1990 and 2010 elderly people in Japan
attached more importance to health and income, and less importance to financial
dissatisfaction. These changes predict an increase of life satisfaction that is par-
tially offset by the lower importance for life satisfaction of aspects such as having
children and social capital. Among the social capital variables, only participation
in Putnamian groups became more positively associated with life satisfaction, but
this change is not sufficient to counterbalance the effect of the other proxies. The
coefficient of trust in others halves, but remains positive, and the ones for civic-
ness and participation in Olsonian groups turn negative. Other negative corre-
lations with life satisfaction include being a man and employment status which
became less important. In 1990 retired people or those working part-time were
more satisfied with their lives than those in full-time employment, but in 2010,
working part-time, being self-employed or retired correlated negatively with life
satisfaction (relative to full-time employment).
The elderly also experienced a significant increase in life satisfaction that was
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Figure 5: Unexplained part of the life satisfaction gap for elderly people between
1990 and 2010
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not captured by the comprehensive set of covariates (see the constant in Table 5 in
Appendix B). Health, family, and other social networks are obvious candidates to
explain this increase, but as they are controlled, the change must operate through
different channels. Another candidate could be a general change in self-perception
or reception in society that was improved through the policy reforms – each could
operate in tandem or independently from the policy change.
The remaining 23 percent of the life satisfaction difference is attributable to
changes in the levels of the explanatory variables over time. The average health of
elderly people and their social involvement increased: participation in Putnamian
groups increased (from 22.5 percent to 49.7 percent) as well as trust in others
(from 27.5 percent to 39.3 percent). These changes explain the shift upward in
life satisfaction that is partially offset by the increase in financial dissatisfaction.
The remaining variables predict a negligible share of the explained gap of life
satisfaction (for more details, see the column “explained” in Table 5).
5.3 Decomposition of the well-being gap between 1990 and 2010
for women
The life satisfaction of women in Japan increased from 6.7 in 1990 to 7.1 in 2010
(see Column 1 of Table 7 in Appendix C). Similar to the elderly, the largest part
(nearly 83%) of the increase is due to changes in womens’ preferences.
Figure 6 – based on Table 7 – shows the main variables affecting the unex-
plained part of the life satisfaction gap. Reduced importance attached to income,
civicness, and social trust correlate with reductions in life satisfaction. The im-
portance of income became nearly five times smaller in 2010 than in 1990. Also
the coefficients of the index of civicness and social trust nearly halved since 1990.
However, the decrease in life satisfaction associated with these changes is counter-
balanced by changes in the correlations with health, age, marital status, number of
kids and, to a minor extent, financial dissatisfaction. Health correlated positively
with life satisfaction in 1990 and the coefficient nearly doubled from 0.29 to 0.56
in 2010. Aging became less negatively correlated with life satisfaction over time.
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Figure 6: Unexplained part of the life satisfaction gap for women between 1990
and 2010
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In 1990, aging attracted a large negative coefficient, while in 2010, it was nearly
zero for women in the age group 35 to 60 (compared to people less than 35). The
coefficient for elderly women (60 years old or more) was positive (although very
small in magnitude).
Changes in the importance of marital status also led to an increase in life sat-
isfaction. In general, being married is associated with greater life satisfaction
than being single (consistent with “the benefits of marriage” (Waite, 1995)), but
this marriage premium is lower in 2010 compared to 1990 – meaning, single
women’s life satisfaction improved over the period. In contrast, the life satis-
faction of divorced, separated, or widowed women declined relative to married
women. Divorce and separation are positively though insignificantly associated
in 1990, but negatively in 2010. Widowed is slightly more negatively associated
in 2010. However, the declines for divorced, separated, and widowed women are
more than offset by the positive ones for single women.
Another important change in women’s correlates of life satisfaction is related
to the number of children. The literature has shown that having children is often
negatively associated with life satisfaction (e.g. Ono and Lee, 2013). The effect of
having children is negatively correlated to marital happiness in Japan, and more
so for women than for men (Lee and Ono, 2008). Having children is negatively
associated with life satisfaction in the present analysis as well, but the negative
association improved over the period 1990-2010. In particular, having two or
more children has nearly a nil association with life satisfaction in 2010, whereas
in 1990 the coefficient is -0.44, i.e. nearly half the size of the coefficient of being
unemployed.
The changes in women’s correlates of life satisfaction are compatible with
the policy reforms adopted in Japan, especially in relation to: aging and raising
children. Women also experienced a significant increase in life satisfaction that
was not captured by the comprehensive set of covariates (see the constant in Table
7). As with the elderly, this change could represent a general change in self-
perception or reception in society that could have been affected by numerous items
including the policy reforms.
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The remaining 17 percent of women’s increase in life satisfaction, i.e. 0.07
points, is due to changes in the average levels of the explanatory variables (see Ta-
ble 7 in Appendix C). This relatively small amount can be explained by improved
health and a greater involvement in Putnamian associations. In 1990 nearly one
out of five women participated in Putnamian associations, but twenty years later
nearly 36.6 percent of women reported participating in at least one Putnamian
association. On the other hand, life satisfaction decreased because of increased
financial dissatisfaction and decreased trust in others. In particular, the share of
women who declared trusting others went from 47.7 percent in 1990 to 40.8 per-
cent in 2010. The changes of the other variables had negligible effects on the life
satisfaction gap.
6 Conclusions
Japan provides a most interesting case study for policy makers hoping to improve
the well-being of their citizens. Post World War II, Japan experienced exciting
economic growth rates that extended into the 1980s. However, later concerns be-
gan to arise due to an impending demographic crisis, specifically aging and low
fertility rates. At the same time intergenerational ties and traditional family-based
social support weakened. In the 1990s policy makers reformed the social safety
net system moving Japan from a familialist-corporatist system to a social demo-
cratic model. Subsequently, while economic growth slowed, well-being increased
(1990 - 2010), which provides a sharp contrast with the earlier period of high
growth and stagnating well-being (1981 - 1990).
Using Blinder - Oaxaca decomposition techniques and data from the World
Values Survey, we show that the increase in life satisfaction from 1990 to 2010
is attributable in part to an aging population, but a population where the elderly
are more satisfied with their lives. Also, health and its importance increased, and
women became more satisfied with their lives relative to men. The improvements
for elderly people and women are consistent with the expected impacts of the
policy reforms of the 1990s. However, not all changes were positive. Social trust
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declined (negatively affecting life satisfaction), which was likely due to distinct
forces, such as the impacts of modernization on social capital. Nevertheless the
positive impacts outweighed the negative.
At the time of his writing in 1997, Esping-Andersen explained that the Japanese
welfare state, long viewed as a synthesis of the liberal and conservative regimes,
may still be “in the process of evolution... (and) that it has not yet arrived at the
point of crystallization” (p.187). Now, some 20 years after his observation, it is
becoming increasingly clear that the Japanese welfare state is transitioning from a
familialist/corporatist model to a state-sponsored model. This transformation was
in large part a much needed response to the looming demographic crisis. Steering
the country towards higher fertility and looking after the well-being of the aging
population could not be left to market forces, and a functional substitute was re-
quired to fill the gap which had been left by weakening intergenerational ties and
the declining corporate safety net.
The state-sponsored safety net that was put in place in the 1990s was followed
by an increase in the life satisfaction of the overall population and especially of
the elderly and women. Thus, whether economic growth improves the human
lot depends on certain conditions. In particular, the findings support Easterlin
(2013)’s assertion that a strong state-sponsored social safety net provides one of
the conditions for durably improving people’s well-being. The case of Japan illus-
trates that it is possible to adopt policies to make economic growth and well-being
compatible over time.
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A Detailed decomposition 1990 - 2010
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Table 3: Detailed decomposition of the well-being gap between 1990 and 2010 in
Japan.
satisfaction with life
Differential Explained Unexplained
average value in 2010 6.974∗∗∗
(6.70e+16)
average value in 1990 6.569∗∗∗
(5.14e+16)
difference 0.405∗∗∗
(1.75e+15)
yearly income (real Yen 2010) −0.0105∗∗∗ 0.498∗∗∗
(−17.08) (809.71)
financial dissatisfaction −0.0215∗∗∗ 0.271∗∗∗
(−19.84) (250.09)
health 0.0639∗∗∗ 0.496∗∗∗
(12.38) (96.01)
social trust −0.00568∗∗∗ −0.0431∗∗∗
(−5.57) (−42.31)
civicness 0.00218 −0.532∗∗∗
(0.66) (−160.58)
putnamian groups 0.0291∗∗ −0.0274∗∗
(2.81) (−2.65)
olsonian groups −0.00435 0.0290∗∗∗
(−1.35) (8.99)
age 0.0329∗∗ 0.262∗∗∗
(2.23) (17.74)
female −0.00240∗∗ 0.0818∗∗∗
(−2.59) (88.34)
marital status −0.0212∗ 0.0744∗∗∗
(−1.88) (6.59)
number of children 0.00241∗∗ 0.226∗∗∗
(2.01) (188.54)
employment status −0.0113 −0.0350
(−0.33) (−1.01)
total 0.0535 0.352∗∗∗
(1.44) (9.49)
Constant −0.949∗∗∗
(−4.29e+12)
Observations 2393
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Table 4: Coefficients and X-values for 1990 and 2010.
β2010 β1990 βre f X2010 X1990
log yearly income (real Yen 2010) 0.169 0.123 0.168 10.714 10.776
financial dissatisfaction −0.389 −0.444 −0.400 5.004 4.950
health 0.526 0.383 0.510 3.581 3.455
social trust 0.193 0.293 0.215 0.411 0.438
civicness −0.004 0.054 0.017 9.330 9.199
putnamian groups 0.110 0.187 0.170 0.396 0.224
olsonian groups −0.054 −0.256 −0.070 0.200 0.138
35 <= age < 60 years −0.228 −0.538 −0.259 0.485 0.585
60 years and more 0.035 −0.568 0.031 0.356 0.138
female 0.164 0.000 0.131 0.486 0.504
single −0.702 −1.233 −0.803 0.150 0.166
divorced/separated −0.641 −0.358 −0.510 0.062 0.011
widowed −0.531 −0.438 −0.496 0.036 0.020
one child 0.025 −0.341 −0.051 0.152 0.120
two or more children −0.000 −0.274 −0.097 0.629 0.670
part time −0.100 0.276 0.017 0.128 0.095
self employed 0.101 0.050 0.060 0.090 0.115
retired 0.015 0.419 0.086 0.129 0.049
housewife 0.085 0.099 0.062 0.148 0.181
student 0.880 −0.246 0.154 0.010 0.030
unemployed −0.797 0.297 −0.648 0.021 0.004
other 0.652 −0.317 0.248 0.015 0.019
Constant 5.314 6.262 5.211 1.000 1.000
Note: The coefficients of columns β2010, β1990 and βre f are the same as those
from table 2. The values in the last two columns (X2010 and X1990) report the
weighted sample averages of each independent variable.
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B Detailed decomposition 1990 - 2010 for elderly peo-
ple
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Table 5: Detailed decomposition of the well-being gap for elderly people between
1990 and 2010 in Japan.
satisfaction with life
Differential Explained Unexplained
average value in 2010 7.235∗∗∗
(1.41e+16)
average value in 1990 6.696∗∗∗
(1.06e+16)
difference 0.539∗∗∗
(6.61e+14)
yearly income (real Yen 2010) −0.00672∗∗∗ 0.196∗∗∗
(−6.91) (201.92)
financial dissatisfaction −0.112∗∗∗ 0.397∗∗∗
(−29.50) (104.41)
health 0.166∗∗∗ 1.536∗∗∗
(6.72) (62.34)
social trust 0.0354∗∗∗ −0.0693∗∗∗
(3.81) (−7.45)
civicness −0.00248 −0.685∗∗∗
(−1.37) (−378.35)
putnamian groups 0.0481∗ −0.00367
(1.85) (−0.14)
olsonian groups −0.00425 −0.0446∗∗∗
(−0.75) (−7.85)
age 0 0
(.) (.)
female 0.00107∗∗ 0.118∗∗∗
(2.40) (265.27)
marital status −0.00914 −0.0219∗∗∗
(−1.54) (−3.70)
number of children 0.0108∗∗ −0.920∗∗∗
(2.65) (−226.30)
employment status 0.00199 −0.233∗∗∗
(0.11) (−12.87)
total 0.128∗∗∗ 0.410∗∗∗
(3.69) (11.79)
Constant 0.141∗∗∗
(6.03e+12)
Observations 690
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Table 6: Coefficients and X-values of the sample of elderly people for 1990 and
2010 .
β2010 β1990 βre f X2010 X1990
log yearly income (real Yen 2010) 0.155 0.136 0.139 10.516 10.565
financial dissatisfaction −0.457 −0.547 −0.465 4.643 4.402
health 0.611 0.128 0.567 3.449 3.157
social trust 0.245 0.475 0.299 0.393 0.275
civicness −0.051 0.022 −0.034 9.509 9.436
putnamian groups 0.108 0.040 0.177 0.497 0.225
olsonian groups −0.111 0.357 −0.062 0.156 0.088
35 <= age < 60 years 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
60 years and more 0.000 0.000 0.000 1.000 1.000
female 0.129 −0.127 0.104 0.471 0.461
divorced/widowed −0.470 −0.324 −0.423 0.131 0.127
single −0.335 0.000 −0.237 0.032 0.000
one child −0.137 0.682 −0.121 0.119 0.147
two or more children −0.430 0.532 −0.362 0.813 0.833
part time −0.060 0.552 0.025 0.116 0.069
self employed −0.094 −0.070 −0.067 0.124 0.098
retired −0.066 0.532 0.044 0.364 0.304
other 0.000 −0.234 −0.048 0.020 0.020
Constant 6.391 6.249 6.364 1.000 1.000
Note: The coefficients of columns β2010, β1990 and βre f are the same as those
from table 2. The values in the last two columns (X2010 and X1990) report the
weighted sample averages of each independent variable.
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C Detailed decomposition 1990 - 2010 for women
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Table 7: Detailed decomposition of the well-being gap for women between 1990
and 2010 in Japan.
satisfaction with life
Differential Explained Unexplained
average value in 2010 7.120∗∗∗
(1.94e+16)
average value in 1990 6.694∗∗∗
(6.24e+15)
difference 0.425∗∗∗
(3.75e+14)
yearly income (real Yen 2010) −0.00835 −1.915∗∗∗
(−1.45) (−331.85)
financial dissatisfaction −0.0405∗∗∗ 0.106∗∗∗
(−61.20) (159.69)
health 0.0989∗∗∗ 0.947∗∗∗
(5.68) (54.39)
social trust −0.0144∗ −0.112∗∗∗
(−1.85) (−14.39)
civicness 0.00651∗∗ −0.185∗∗∗
(2.83) (−80.25)
putnamian groups 0.0217∗ −0.0513∗∗∗
(1.68) (−3.98)
olsonian groups −0.00438∗∗ 0.0182∗∗∗
(−2.39) (9.96)
age 0.00919 0.342∗∗∗
(0.37) (13.91)
marital status 0.000761 0.109∗∗∗
(0.03) (3.63)
number of children −0.00207∗∗ 0.232∗∗∗
(−3.23) (362.20)
employment status 0.00195 0.0706∗
(0.05) (1.92)
Total 0.0693∗∗ 0.356∗∗∗
(2.84) (14.59)
Constant 0.794∗∗∗
(9.58e+12)
Observations 1176
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Table 8: Coefficients and X-values of the sample of women for 1990 and 2010 .
β2010 β1990 βre f X2010 X1990
log yearly income (real Yen 2010) 0.048 0.226 0.094 10.680 10.769
financial dissatisfaction −0.402 −0.425 −0.404 4.864 4.764
health 0.569 0.295 0.520 3.619 3.429
social trust 0.129 0.376 0.209 0.408 0.477
civicness 0.023 0.043 0.033 9.357 9.158
putnamian groups 0.079 0.257 0.157 0.366 0.228
olsonian groups −0.098 −0.333 −0.099 0.122 0.078
35 <= age < 60 years −0.048 −0.503 −0.157 0.507 0.550
60 years and more 0.053 −0.645 0.011 0.345 0.126
single −0.307 −1.135 −0.545 0.127 0.172
divorced/separated −0.369 0.348 −0.204 0.083 0.013
widowed −0.417 −0.387 −0.390 0.059 0.035
one child −0.217 −0.235 −0.215 0.161 0.147
two or more children −0.088 −0.446 −0.231 0.640 0.643
part time 0.096 0.365 0.183 0.204 0.155
self employed 0.294 −0.062 0.147 0.068 0.088
retired 0.518 0.930 0.571 0.070 0.016
housewife 0.356 0.190 0.281 0.304 0.359
student 1.013 −0.066 0.280 0.010 0.029
unemployed −0.773 −0.784 −0.712 0.019 0.005
other 1.179 −0.027 0.612 0.017 0.024
Constant 6.211 5.416 5.846 1.000 1.000
Note: The coefficients of columns β2010, β1990 and βre f are the same as those
from table 2. The values in the last two columns (X2010 and X1990) report the
weighted sample averages of each independent variable.
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D List of groups and associations mentioned in the
WVS/EVS questionnaire
Respondents were asked to mention whether they belonged or were performing
unpaid voluntary work for any of the following list of associations:
Associations considered to be Putnamian
• social welfare service for elderly;
• religious organization;
• education, arts, music or cultural activities;
• political parties;
• local political actions;
• human rights;
• conservation, the environment, ecology, animal rights;
• conservation, the environment, ecology;
• animal rights;
• sports or recreation;
• women’s group;
• peace movement;
• consumer groups;
• other groups.
Associations considered to be Olsonian
• labour unions;
• organization concerned with health;
• professional associations;
• youth work;
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